Dueling “elders” compete to reconcile the OLF and TPLF- WikiLeaks.

Reconciliation of the Shanee Group of OLF and the TPLF regime in Ethiopia has become a business venture for some so called Oromo “elders.” According to another leaked document, in 2008, two groups of “elders” talking to two different Shanee groups were competing for Meles’s attention and for funding by the US embassy in Finfinnee.

The first group, referred to in the document as Elders 1, led by Prof. Ephraim Isaac and Pastor Daniel Gebreselassie handled “OLF elders” - the likes of Dima Nago, Lenco Lata and Ababiya Abajobir. According to the document, Ababiya Abajobir returned to Ethiopia one week after the three were contacted in Amsterdam which encouraged Ephraim Isaac to suggest “that Ababiya's unharassed return reflects only the first step in a looming wave of former OLF leaders' returns to Ethiopia.”

The second group, which the document refers to as Elders 2, consisted of AMb. Berhanu Dinka, Rev. Itaffa Gobana and Aberra Tola. Elders 2 dealt with the Daud Ibsa group which the document referred to as “Asmara-based”. Their purpose was to force the Shanee group to surrender or “risk losing the support of the in-country Oromo community.”

Both “elder” groups told the US embassy that TPLF “expects the OLF to unilaterally abandon its professed strategy of armed struggle without any prior indications of the GoE's willingness to reconcile beyond the word of the Prime Minister passed through intermediaries.” But all the same, “Prof. Ephraim and Amb. Dinka emphasized that they believe that the Prime Minister's receptivity to reconciliation with the OLF remains intact, and that he may be placating the OPDO, and hard-liners within the TPLF, with the current crack-down to cover his own strategy of returning the OLF to Ethiopian politics.” Blinded by self-interest, they never fail to find excuses for Meles’ actions against my people. Some “Oromo elders!”

Contrast that with the ambassador’s comments: “The GoE's harassment, arrests, and crack-down on Oromos and Oromo political parties, sends a clear message, in our assessment, that the GoE is not sincerely committed to meeting the OLF even part way in breaching the GoE-OLF divide.”

Related Articles:

Beware of Mediator Bias and Mediation as a Tactic: A word to the Wise
Melles to [the Asmara Group of] OLF: Leave Asmara or No Talks
Abbabiya Abba Jobir Returns to Ethiopia; Leenco Lata & Dima Nego to follow soon?
Best Practices for an Aspiring Tyrant

Have your say!

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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003188

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID ET
SUBJECT: RECONCILING THE OROMO LIBERATION FRONT AND
ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT

REF: A. ADDIS 3159
¶B. ADDIS 2487

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (SBU) Recognizing that the outlawed Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) is widely supported -- at least in principle -- among Ethiopia's largest ethnic group, Embassy Addis Ababa has long held that reconciliation between the Ethiopian Government (GoE) and OLF is critical to the long-term political stability of Ethiopia. Holding a similar view, two separate groups of Ethiopian "elders" have worked in recent months to bring the OLF -- formerly a partner of the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) until the lack of power sharing by the EPRDF led it to advocate armed struggle against the GoE in 1992 -- back into the fold of legal political parties within Ethiopia. While the GoE's persistent harassment of legal Oromo opposition parties in Ethiopia and its recent crackdown on Oromos (Ref. A) has certainly not sent the necessary gesture of goodwill to the OLF in exile, the moderation of some OLF elders in the diaspora combined with the Prime Minister's approval of both "elders" processes suggest that there may be an emergent opening for reconciliation and a positive role the USG could play.
End Summary.

THE DUELING ELDERS
------------------

¶2. (SBU) Coming off of the success of brokering the pardon of the opposition leaders arrested in November 2005, Professor Ephraim Isaac and Pastor Daniel Gebreselassie (Elders 1), approached the Embassy to support their efforts to broker various reconciliation efforts, including the GoE and the OLF. While the Elders 1 group was critical in the opposition pardon, they, and Prof. Ephraim in particular, were often seen as partisan through the process, exerting significant pressure on the opposition leaders to admit their guilt while not press the GoE to stand down or temper its position against them. Since then, Prof. Ephraim (himself an Oromo) and his colleagues have unilaterally reached out to various OLF elders including former Chairman Leencho Lata and grandson of the last king of Jimma, Ababiya Abajobir, and Dima Negewo, around reconciling with the GoE. The Elders 1 group met these three in Amsterdam September 19-21 along with the Ethiopian Ambassador to the Netherlands. One week later, Ababiya returned to Ethiopia after years in exile. Prof. Ephraim informed Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief on November 4 that Prime Minister Meles continues to support his group's efforts to reach out to the OLF, and suggested that Ababiya's unharassed return reflects only the first step in a looming wave of former OLF leaders' returns to Ethiopia.

¶3. (SBU) While the Elders 1 process was afoot, a second team of Oromo elders (Elders 2) approached the Embassy with a new proposal. Ambassador Berhanu Dinka, Head of the Mekane Yesus Church Rev. Itaffa Gobana, and Oxfam America Director Aberra Tola offered a new option (Ref. B). The Elders 2 group reported in late September that a group of Oromo community leaders from within Ethiopia approached the three, previously rather apolitical prominent Oromos soliciting that they attempt to reconcile the GoE and OLF. Amb. Dinka reported that based on approval by Prime Minister Meles for his team to approach the OLF, the Elders 2 succeeded in January 2008 in getting an initial written commitment (the Amsterdam Agreement) from OLF Chairman Dawud Ibsa that the OLF would "accept, in principle," the Ethiopian constitution. When taken to the Prime Minister in the spring, Meles expressed skepticism about the statement and requested that the Elders 2 reconfirm that the OLF Executive Committee agreed to it. Despite outreach to, and receiving the support of, a broad variety of prominent Oromos in the diaspora around this effort, OLF Executive Committee members based in Asmara rejected the statement.

¶4. (SBU) Amb. Dinka presented us with a proposal in late September that he claimed had been endorsed by prominent figures at the Oromo Studies Association meeting in July, the community leaders in Ethiopia who initially approached his group, and several key OLF-related individuals. The proposal was to convene a conference of major Oromo elders and community leaders in Ethiopia to produce a declaration insisting that the OLF pursue reconciliation with the GoE. Amb. Dinka argued that such a consensus declaration could persuade Asmara-based OLF hard-liners -- hardened either by principle or due to pressure exerted on them by Eritrean President Isaias not to engage the GoE -- either to agree to engage the GoE or risk losing the support of the in-country Oromo community.

¶5. (SBU) When queried on the duplication of "elders" activities with Prof. Ephraim's group, Ambassador Dinka argued that Prof. Ephraim had lost the confidence of the Oromos for his partisan interventions on the GoE's behalf in the opposition pardon effort. Additionally, as an Oromo elder himself and having had a brother killed by GoE forces for alleged ties to the OLF, Prof. Ephraim, Amb. Dinka argued, is particularly not a credible advocate among Oromos because he has never once advocated to the GoE for the pardon or release of the thousands of Oromos detained in Ethiopia. Amb. Dinka further dismissed Elders 1's reconciliation efforts with the OLF noting that OLF Chairman Dawud Ibsa himself had written a letter to Prof. Ephraim arguing that the OLF leadership would not engage with him. In response to our skepticism about the receptivity of the EPRDF's Oromo sub-party the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), Amb. Dinka argued that he and his group had discussed the issue with OPDO leaders including Addis Mayor Kuma Demeksa, Trade Minister Girma Birru, and Oromiya Regional President Abadula. While admitting that Abadula was initially opposed to such outreach, he later came around, and Kuma and Girma both supported the initiative. Amb. Dinka speculated that the OPDO support may reflect a desire for the OPDO to gain credibility within Ethiopia and shed the public perception of the party as an Oromo puppet of the Tigrayan leadership. Bringing the OLF back to Ethiopia, and possibly pursuing a future alliance with the EPRDF could offer a chance to aspiring OPDO leaders to later join the OLF, gain legitimacy, and pursue higher office. While we were skeptical that much of an opening genuinely existed among either the OLFQr the GoE, the proposed approach was novel, low cost, and offered a slight opportunity potentially to help stabilize Ethiopia's increasingly fragile political climate. As such, the Ambassador confirmed with the Prime Minister the latter's support for this effort and we funded the conference.

CONVENING ETHIOPIA'S OROMOS
---------------------------
¶6. (SBU) On October 30 and 31, the Elders 2 convened ten apolitical elders and community leaders from Addis Ababa and each zone of Oromiya to discuss how to bring the OLF back into the fold of legal political parties in Ethiopia. In a November 1 declaration, the 160 elders "strongly demanded that the OLF leadership heed the genuine desire of the Oromo people and enter into negotiations with the GoE" on the basis of the Amsterdam Agreement. On November 3, 30 of the assembled elders met with Prime Minister Meles to report on the conference and express concerns about the recent crack-down on Oromos in Ethiopia. Meles reportedly informed the group that he has two roles which he must balance: 1) maintaining law and order in the face of credible threats, and 2) promoting political reconciliation. As such, Meles affirmed that the GoE would continue to crack-down on anyone overtly supporting the OLF through actions, but would otherwise press for leniency toward those who simply support the OLF politically or in principle.

¶7. (SBU) On November 14, Amb. Dinka and his two colleagues briefed the press on their conference and the details of the Oromo leaders' declaration. On November 15, the OLF Executive Committee issued a press release noting that it had previously informed the Elders that it would not sign on to the Amsterdam Agreement as the OLF retains its position that "the OLF is committed to dialogue without precondition in the presence of a third party." Despite this statement, the Elders 2 group is not surprised by, and plans to reach out to the Asmara-based OLF leadership directly to assess whether the statement accurately reflects the OLF's actual position, or more the position that they must take while living in Asmara under the influence and pressure of Isaias.

IS THE GOE RECEPTIVE?
---------------------

¶8. (SBU) As reported in Ref. A, the Elders 2 conference of Oromo leaders coincided with a significant crack-down on Oromos in Ethiopia, re-igniting the question of the GoE's sincerity in reconciling with the OLF. Fundamentally, both Prof. Ephraim and Amb. Dinka have acknowledged to us in the past few months that the GoE is not willing to change its own tactics domestically with regard to the Oromo community or legal Oromo political parties in Ethiopia as a confidence building gesture. Instead, both elders have argued, the GoE expects the OLF to unilaterally abandon its professed strategy of armed struggle without any prior indications of the GoE's willingness to reconcile beyond the word of the Prime Minister passed through intermediaries.

¶9. (C) In response to our inquiries, Amb. Dinka speculated that the recent GoE crack-down on Oromos results from a resurgence of concern from the OPDO that the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) at the core of the EPRDF may abandon the OPDO for the OLF as it's Oromo partner should the OLF return to the domestic political scene. Despite this crack-down, both Prof. Ephraim and Amb. Dinka emphasized that they believe that the Prime Minister's receptivity to reconciliation with the OLF remains intact, and that he may be placating the OPDO, and hard-liners within the TPLF, with the current crack-down to cover his own strategy of returning the OLF to Ethiopian politics.

FINAL COMMENT AND NOTE
--------------------

¶10. (C) The GoE's harassment, arrests, and crack-down on Oromos and Oromo political parties, sends a clear message, in our assessment, that the GoE is not sincerely committed to meeting the OLF even part way in breaching the GoE-OLF divide. Just as the GoE's unrelenting assault on the domestic Oromo community impedes reconciliation, so to does the OLF's unwillingness to accept, even in principle, the Ethiopian constitution as a basic precondition to talks. The Elders 2 initiative provided a novel approach and a narrow window of opportunity, which we recognized before deciding to support their proposed conference. Despite the minuscule chance of the conference producing a break-through, having a consensus document endorsed by prominent elders and community leaders from throughout Oromiya calling on the OLF to pursue reconciliation with the GoE is a useful step.

¶11. (C) Embassy Addis Ababa fundamentally believes that GoE reconciliation with the OLF is critical to Ethiopia's long-term stability. If the USG chooses to support or facilitate GoE-OLF reconciliation -- as we did from 2004 to 2006 -- we must be prepared to exert pressure on both parties to offer confidence building gestures toward the other including a GoE pardon of alleged OLF prisoners and easing in the harassment of Oromos in Ethiopia as well as a unilateral declaration by the OLF to cease, at least temporarily, its commitment to armed struggle. Should the USG seek to pursue such efforts, it may be useful for AF and/or INR/AA to reach out to OLF leaders in the U.S. and Europe, as well as for Embassy Asmara to reach out to OLF Chairman Dawud Ibsa and members of the OLF Executive Committee separately, to explore the relative merits of the two "elders" initiatives, perceptions on the opening for reconciliation, and press for a commitment to re-attempt reconciliation. With the Elders 2 declaration, the Oromo people in Ethiopia have clearly stated that they are no longer looking for conflict, but for a peaceful approach to reverse Oromo marginalization. If the OLF can show themselves to be politicians and statesmen, the world would certainly be more sympathetic to their cause.
End Comment.
YAMAMOTO

WikiLeaks on "REACHING OUT TO THE [Shanee Group of] OLF ..."

A secret document leaked by WikiLeaks (see below) confirms that the Oromo struggle continues to be used as a pawn in the chess game played by western powers on their Horn of Africa chess board.

If history is any guide, it is not likely that this "REACHING OUT TO THE [Shanee Group of] OLF ..." would be in search of a just resolution of the conflict between Oromia and Ethiopia which would be the decolonization of Oromia through the Oromo people’s right of self-determination. The sole purpose in this case seems to be the isolation of Eritrea, another state using the Oromo struggle as a pawn in its chess game against the West and its neighbor to the south.

Eritrea and the West share a common interest, albeit to a differing degree, when it comes to the OLF. A weakened OLF is in the best interest of both. The West would like to see a OLF weakened to the point of surrendering to TPLF without or with minimal face saving concessions for its demands. In that way, it can keep one of its tyrant clients – Meles Zenawi - happy and in power. Eritrea, on the other hand, would not want to see a strong and independent OLF that can take on TPLF on its own. But, neither does it want to see OLF surrender to TPLF before it (Eritrea) has a chance to use it (the OLF) as a bargaining chip in possible future negotiations with TPLF. It would require a total suspension of logic and rational thought to be able to imagine a deal between the two which would not include the fate of THE [Shanee Group of] OLF while they are both (Shanee – The Dawud Ibsaa Group, and Jijjiirama – The Kamal Gelchu Group) stationed in Asmara.

One tried and true method both sides use to keep the OLF weak and pathetic is by helping it replicate itself every few years. How? They simply refer to some of the OLF leaders as “moderates” and to others as “hard-liners.” To top it up, they throw in Meles’ wish to negotiate with the moderates. Then, the race to become the darling of the West would begin. Given the omnipotence some leaders of the Shanee Group of OLF attach to the West and their craving for West’s attention, they start talking to the West behind each other’s backs and promising to meet the set conditions including renouncing armed struggle, accepting the TPLF constitution or whatever is asked of them.

In 1998 a group of OLF leaders, led by Lenco Lata and referred to as “moderates”, signed agreement with World Lutheran Federation (WLF) to accept the TPLF constitution and renounce armed struggle. They gained nothing for doing so except contempt and disregard from the West, TPLF and the Oromo public. Their action split the leaders in to two groups. Another group of OLF leaders, led by Dawud Ibsaa and referred to as “moderates”, accepted the same conditions set by the West and TPLF in the form of “Agenda for Peace” in 2000. Besides causing the organization to split and earning the leaders of the organization contempt from the Oromo mass and others, nothing was gained by this group's action either. In 2008, this later “moderate” group split into two: one led by Dawud Ibsaa a.k.a Shanee and another led by Kamal Gelchu a.k.a. Jijjiirama. It is not enough for the West and TPLF that these two groups offered their “Agenda for Peace” as moderates before their split. As you can read from the leaked document below, they have to further be dichotomized into “moderates and hard-liners” to weaken them further.

Having learned nothing from history and in its race to become the darling of the West, the Kemal Gelchu group has come up with “OLF Declaration of Non-violent Struggle against Meles Zenawi and its Tyrannical Regime” ( READ HERE)

This is particularly interesting coming from a group whose leader was once a loyal TPLF soldier who purportedly left Ethiopia because he felt it was impossible to defeat Meles Zenawi through peaceful methods but only by waging armed struggle. Before he even fires his first bullet as a liberation fighter, he disowns armed struggle. This smells like the Trojan horse Spartans used to defeat Troy from which the adage “beware of gift bearing Greeks” originates. I plan to return to this issue at a later date. (READ HERE)

What is my point?

May point is that what TPLF and the West are looking for is not a moderate OLF. If that was the case, they would have been satisfied with those who signed the WLF agreement and would have pressured or persuaded Meles to compromise with them. They did not! Had the West was looking for a moderate OLF, it would have been satisfied with the group that published “Agenda for Peace” in 2000. It did not happen! That group got no help from the West, nor any compromise from Meles. What they are looking for is a OLF weakened into nonexistence. In other words, the only way you can satisfy them is by destroying the OLF, not by being “moderates”.

Oromo nationalists should Resist! Resist! and Resist this machination at all cost!

===Leaked Document Begins Here=====
Reference ID: 07ADDISABABA1961
Created: 2007-06-23 14:48
Released: 2011-08-30 01:44
Classification: SECRET
Origin: Embassy Addis Ababa


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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001961

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS ER ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: REACHING OUT TO THE OLF AND CUTTING
ERITREA'S DIVISIVE INFLUENCE


Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASON: 1.4 (D).

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Norwegian Church Aid representatives Arne Saeveraas and Hans Birkeland told Ambassador June 21 that while there was little progress on their mediation efforts between the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ethiopian Government, they were keeping lines of communications open. The continued presence of OLF hard-liners and leaders in Asmara remains a stumbling block to progress in engaging Ethiopian leaders and the OLF, but the Norwegians are hopeful that they can bring moderate elements of the OLF into closer dialogue with Ethiopian officials. Sebhat Nega, TPLF central committee member and stalwart within the Ethiopian government, is scheduled to travel to Europe in the near future to meet with OLF representatives. The Norwegians believe that strong U.S. support for the moderate OLF leadership will help undercut Asmara,s divisive influence and bolster a greater opening between the OLF and Ethiopian government. Embassy supports Norway's approach and believes encouragement of the Ethiopian Government and outreach to the OLF moderates on a dialogue will enhance internal Ethiopian peace and stability. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (S/NF) Norwegian Church Aid special advisor Arne Saeveraas and country representative Hans Birkeland briefed Ambassador on their latest discussions with Ethiopian officials on an OLF engagement. Saeveraas said Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian Government remained hopeful but that the current dialogue between the OLF and Ethiopian Government (which is conducted in Brussels through former Ethiopian Ambassador to the U.S. and current Ambassador to the EU Berhane Gebrechristol) required higher Ethiopian attention. Ambassador Berhane, a conservative hard-line member of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), had been a barrier to dialogue. Saeveraas noted that TPLF central committee member and stalwart of the Ethiopian Government, Sebhat Nega, who remains a close advisor to Prime Minister Meles, plans to travel to Europe in August to meet with moderate OLF officials.

¶3. (S/NF) While Sebhat,s involvement is hopeful, Saeveraas is trying to push the Ethiopians to reach out and engage the moderate elements of the OLF rather than to set conditions for expanded dialogue. Saeveraas noted that so long as Asmara hosted and played a significant role influencing the hard-line OLF members and much of the leadership, expanded OLF-Ethiopia dialogue would be difficult. Saeveraas said moderate OLF leaders like former leader Leencho Lata were being marginalized by more hard-line members resident in Asmara.

---------------------
U.S. MUST PLAY A ROLE
---------------------

¶4. (S/NF) Saeveraas and Birkeland both underscored the importance of the U.S. to the process. Public encouragement by the U.S. and other countries for the moderate wing of the OLF would help bolster OLF leaders seeking a dialogue with Ethiopia and moderate the influence of the hard-liners in Eritrea. Saeveraas suggested that Norway could host a meeting of the OLF leadership, including those from Asmara, but there needed to be strong support from the U.S. and other countries to help moderate OLF leaders demonstrate to their membership that the path of dialogue was more effective than armed resistance and the more intolerant rhetoric of hard-line members.

¶5. (S/NF) Further, both Norwegian Church Aid officials said that the U.S. and other countries privately encouraging the Ethiopian Government to reach out to the moderate OLF leaders would be the best way to undercut Asmara,s negative influence.

¶6. (S/NF) COMMENT. Over two years ago, the Africa Bureau, working with Norway, engaged moderate elements of the OLF and encouraged Prime Minister Meles and his envoy, Ambassador Berhane, to take a more positive approach to OLF-Ethiopia Government discussions. A meeting with some OLF leaders, including a few based in Asmara, over two years ago at the State Department, while highly encouraging, did not lead to greater USG involvement, because of the lack of interagency consensus and differing views with Post which did not fully support engagement.

¶7. (S/NF) COMMENT CONTINUED. Tough measures adopted by Ethiopian security forces in parts of the country in response to increased security threats and continued political differences between Oromo and Ethiopian Government leaders make dialogue between the Government and the OLF challenging. A dialogue with moderate elements, an effort Prime Minister Meles supports, should be encouraged. Post recommends that the interagency support the Norwegian efforts for a moderate OLF-Ethiopian Government dialogue, and that the U.S. play a greater supportive role, along with our European colleagues, in encouraging expanded dialogue. Getting the OLF leadership and supporters out of Asmara would be critical to a successful dialogue, but the U.S. and others will need to encourage the OLF that dialogue will be more beneficial in securing long-term peace, than armed resistance or opposition to dialogue. END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO

Wikileaks on Kuma Demeksa, Born Taye Teklehaimanot: “opportunistic, reclusive and not well regarded in Oromiya region”

WikiLeaks, the non-profit organization dedicated to publishing previously classified, hidden or sensitive documents, has released one on Kuma Demeksa of TPLF/OPDO from 2008 in which he is characterized as “opportunistic, reclusive and not well regarded in Oromiya region” by the former US ambassador to Ethiopia. What the Oromo knew for many years – that Kuma is not Oromo and that he was “born in Oromiya Region of Amhara parents” (see below) - is also confirmed in this message.

Enjoy!
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001416
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: KDEM PINR PGOV PREL PHUM ET
SUBJECT: PARTY-HACK ANOINTED MAYOR OF ADDIS ABABA

SUMMARY

¶1. (SBU) Following its landslide victory in the April 2008 local elections, the ruling Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) appointed Defense Minister Kuma Demeksa, an opportunistic 50-year old party loyalist, as mayor of Addis Ababa. In a conference held at the City Hall on May 20, the EPRDF also selected the Deputy Mayor, as well as the Secretary General, the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the City Council.

¶2. (U) The 137 EPRDF city council members-elect appointed Kuma Demeksa Mayor of Addis Ababa in a ceremony held at the City Hall on May 20. Other EPRDF members selected for office include: Kefyalew Azeze--Deputy Mayor; Woizero Sinkinesh Atale--Speaker of the Addis Ababa Council; Elias Seid--Deputy Speaker of the Council; and Woizero Negede Lema--Secretary General of Addis Ababa Council. The EPRDF also selected ten heads of the various bureaus in the city administration: Abate Setotaw, Youth and Sports; Dulamo Otore, Education, Tsegaye H/Mariam, Justice and Security; Belaynesh Teklai, Finance and Economic Development, Fikru Merga, Trade and Industry; Getachew H/Mariam, Works and Urban Development; Daba Debele, Capacity Building; Dr. Hussein Mohammed, Health; Gebretsadik Hagos, Culture and Tourism; Ejigayehu Akberot, Women's Affairs. END SUMMARY.

BIO ON THE MAYOR

¶3. (U) The newly-elected mayor, Kuma Demeksa, a.k.a. Taye Teklehaimanot, was born in Oromiya Region of Amhara parents in 1958. He completed his elementary and secondary education in Gore town, Illubabor Zone of Oromiya Region. Kuma joined an elite police force in the early 1970's and was promoted to the rank of captain after the 1974 revolution that brought the "Dergue" military regime of Mengistu Hailemariam to power. As a member of the elite police force, Kuma served in Eritrea, where he was captured and made a prisoner of war by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) guerilla forces.

¶4. (SBU) In an agreement reached between Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and EPLF in 1981, the guerilla forces handed Kuma over to TPLF. TPLF "re-educated" Kuma and allowed him to join the Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement, EPDM (the non-Tigrayan, junior partner of TPLF). In 1990, Kuma Demeksa quit EPDM to form the Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Oromo wing of EPRDF. When the EPRDF coalition came to power in 1991, Kuma was appointed as Minister of Interior in the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1991-1995). Kuma's leverage at the helm of the Interior Ministry was overshadowed by the effective control held by Tigrayan security chief Kinfe Gebre Medhin (assassinated in May 2001). When Ethiopia's federal government was established in 1995, Kuma was elected head of the executive committee of Oromiya Region. Kuma remained President of Oromiya region until July 2001.

¶5. (SBU) Kuma temporarily fell out of favor following the split within TPLF in the Spring of 2001 because he supported the dissident TPLF group led by Seeye Abraha, who was later jailed for six years for corruption. In July 2001, Kuma was officially removed from his position as president of Oromiya region and Secretary General of OPDO because of allegations of corruption, abuse of power and anti-democratic practices. He laid low for more than a year.

¶6. (SBU) In late 2002, Kuma re-emerged and was appointed as one of the three State Ministers at the Ministry of Capacity Building under the supervision of the austere party ideologue, Tefera Waliwa. He served as state minister until October 2005. Embassy contacts say that Kuma convinced the TPLF leadership that he had been "reformed" and demonstrated unconditional loyalty to the party while serving as State Minister under the watchful eyes of Tefera Waliwa. Kuma was subsequently appointed as Minister of Defense in October 2005 when Prime Minister Meles reshuffled his cabinet in the wake of the 2005 national election.

¶7. (U) Kuma has been married twice and is a father of seven, with three children from his first wife and four from his current wife. Kuma received his first and second degrees from the London-based UK Open University while working as State Minister at the Ministry of Capacity building.

COMMENT

¶8. (SBU) Kuma's critics describe him as a colorless party-hack who has "been everywhere and has reached nowhere." Kuma is quite and reclusive and rarely meets with non-party members. However, he is committed to the party and very loyal to Prime Minister Meles. Kuma is said to be a survivor because he respects authority, is reclusive and keeps a low profile. He is not well regarded in Oromiya region, where he served as President for over six years, and has been labelled indecisive and ineffective. Kuma's appointment as Mayor has puzzled many residents of Addis Ababa. Observers expected that the EPRDF would appoint a sharper and more apt Mayor to address the multi-faceted social, political and economic problems of the city in order to win the hearts and minds of residents who voted overwhelmingly in favor of the opposition in 2005, and largely stayed home during the 2008 local elections. END COMMENT.

YAMAMOTO

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